Publication details

Chicago Pragmatism and the Extended Mind Theory : Mead and Dewey on the Nature of Cognition

Authors

MADZIA Roman

Year of publication 2013
Type Article in Periodical
Magazine / Source European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
MU Faculty or unit

Faculty of Arts

Citation
Web http://lnx.journalofpragmatism.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/17_madzia.pdf
Field Philosophy and religion
Keywords cognition; epistemolog;y Dewey; Mead; extended mind
Description The goal of the paper is twofold. First, it examines the pragmatic ramifications of recent research in certain areas of cognitive science (embodied mind theory, extended mind theory). Second, it shows how the Chicago pragmatists (George H. Mead, John Dewey) not only envisioned these findings but also how, within certain strains of cognitive science, their work is explicitly appreciated for important preliminary insights which help us interpret the outcomes of current research. The argumentative line of the paper revolves around Mead's and Dewey's treatment of the relation between perception and action. Cognition, in the view of the Chicago pragmatists, is not divisible into atomistic, ontologically disconnected units but rather should be seen as an organic circuit within which stimuli and responses are mutually interdependent phases of an ongoing goal-directed active involvement of the organism in the environmental structures. According to the Mead and Dewey, as well as the presently burgeoning branch of cognitive science called the "extended mind theory", cognition is not something that takes place exclusively in our heads but should be rather seen as an objective relation between organism and the environment. On the background of Mead's theory of the act (with its four stages – impulse, perception, manipulation, and consummation) the author points out to certain striking similarities between the pragmatists' treatment of the notion of cognition and ideas recently suggested by defenders of the extended mind theory.
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