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Publication details
Definice morální intuice aneb O užitečnosti konceptuální analýzy v morální psychologii
Title in English | Definition of Moral Intuition or On the Usefulness of Conceptual Analysis in Moral Psychology |
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Authors | |
Year of publication | 2016 |
Type | Appeared in Conference without Proceedings |
MU Faculty or unit | |
Citation | |
Description | Over the last 15 years the term moral intuition has become prominent in empirically oriented study of morality. However, its meaning is far from being clear – various researchers use it in various ways. The unfortunate consequence of this is a plurality of definitions and conceptual confusion. The primary aim of my talk is to show through careful analysis of how is this concept defined or used by various researchers what we should want from a good definition of moral intuition – that is, to which questions it should provide us with answers. Based on these questions, I’ll propose my own, hybrid definition of moral intuition. The secondary aim is to show through this analysis in what ways can a philosopher be useful for the project of empirical study of morality without the need to get his hands dirty with data collection. |
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