Publication details
Naturalizace klasického morálního charakteru
| Title in English | Naturalization of classical moral character |
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| Authors | |
| Year of publication | 2020 |
| Type | Appeared in Conference without Proceedings |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Description | Between 1998 and 2010, a lively discussion took place, in which critics from a position of psychological sciences tried to question the empirical adequacy of the classical concept of moral character (i.e. virtue). Already during this discussion, efforts were made to bring classical theory closer to contemporary empiricism. And although the discussion was not satisfactorily concluded and the criticism supported, these tendencies continued and found their way into key works issuing the moral character. The aim of the presentation is to present and, above all, critically evaluate the ways in which contemporary psychological sciences can update the classical concept of moral character. In this presentation I proceed to and respond to specific efforts to rehabilitate Aristotle's ethical theory, which are based, among other things, on the terminology and general conclusions of the psychological sciences (Russell 2009, Annas 2011, Kamtekar 2012). First of all, I will assess a conceptual adequacy of some newly used terms, which are to replace the classic terms. I will show that although some classical terms are rightly considered problematic with respect to their conceptual grasp, the new terms are semantically poorer and their representation weakens the theory of which the original terms are a part of. At the same time, I will focus on psychological phenomena, which are collectively presented as a source for the potential extension of the classical concept of rationality (i.e. practical wisdom), which is a key part of the classical concept of moral character. Based on my own typology ("support" and "cultivation"), I will distinguish two ways in which the concept of phronesis can be extended by considering these phenomena, showing that some of these extensions have lower theoretical value for moral concepts than others. |
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