Publication details
Biologická kritéria jako východisko morálního statusu: kritika
| Title in English | Biological Criteria As a Basis For Moral Status: Critique |
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| Authors | |
| Year of publication | 2020 |
| Type | Appeared in Conference without Proceedings |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Description | The lecture discusses the topic of moral status based on the comparison of biological criteria. In the introduction, a working definition of moral status will be presented. The aims of the paper are twofold: First, examine whether the definition formulated by the definition is precise and whether (and how) it can be improved. The starting point for this clarification (which will still be provisional) is the fulfillment of the second goal. That is examining whether it is possible to determine whether an entity has a moral value and an interest worthy of protection, to respond on the basis of an examination of its biological properties understood in the broadest sense. Or, more broadly, whether biological powers can be the basis for determining normativity. First, some of the possible approaches to determining moral status will be briefly introduced. Subsequently, their comparison will be performed. Attention will focus on comparing the concept of McMahan and Jaworska with a detailed analysis of its concept "Person rearing relationship". The lecture criticizes the claim that the youngest children have the capacity to actively participate in the educational process and to create a model of adult activities and shows that the whole concept is in fact a special form of argument from potentiality. Within a comparison with McMahan's approach will then show the limits of his approach on concrete examples, which, at first sight, appears to be adversarial with the former, nevertheless gets into unsolvable problems and conflicts with common moral intuition. The lecture concludes with a summary and shows that the definition of moral status on the basis of biological criteria cannot be reliably implemented. Based on this, it proposes to modify the working definition of the moral status. |
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