Publication details
How to Reduce State Expenditures with Single Resolution Mechanism
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2021 |
| Type | Article in Periodical |
| Magazine / Source | Financial law review |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| web | Open access časopisu |
| Keywords | state aid; single resolution mechanism; bank recovery; taxpayers; bail in |
| Description | State aid is one of the wrong ways how to help any private entity when there is no other option, but in certain cases it is necessary from the larger point of view to do so. At least we were used to it especially in cases of big financial (or another) institutions, which are too big to fail, and it might be reasonable to “save” these entities to prevent bigger economic and social loss. For example, when bank fails, then many creditors lose their savings (although there is the deposit guarantee schemes), so they might stop using banking system, many people would lose their jobs (extra social expenses for state). This will all lead to reduce investing money for investors or consumers and that’s basically wrong for economy itself. On the other hand, state aid is highly negative for competition, because all those private entities without any need for state aid are disadvantaged. And finally, its taxpayer’s money, used for state aid and its big state expenditure for any country. The only way how to maintain good and healthy economic system without state aid is prevention. One of the preventions is Single resolution mechanism. |
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