Publication details
Fregovo pojetí pravdy
| Title in English | Frege's Account of Truth |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Year of publication | 2023 |
| Type | Article in Proceedings |
| Conference | QUAERE 2023. Recenzovaný sborník příspěvků interdisciplinární mezinárodní vědecké konference doktorandů a odborných asistentů. |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Web | Open access sborníku |
| Doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.33543/q.2023.13 |
| Keywords | Gottlob Frege; truth; correspondence theory of truth; definability of truth; Ulrich Pardey; interpretation |
| Description | According to the standard interpretation, in the third and fourth paragraphs of the paper called The Thought, Gottlob Frege presents arguments against the correspondence theory of truth and the possibility of defining the concept of truth. In doing so, he commits logical fallacies; the conclusion about the impossibility of defining truth is wrong, as Alfred Tarski, among others, later showed. Ulrich Pardey, in his book "Frege on Absolute and Relative Truth", came up with an alternative interpretation, limiting Frege’s arguments against the correspondence theory and the definability of truth to only one of the types of truth allegedly distinguished by Frege. In this paper I will critique this alternative interpretation. The standard interpretation is right in the sense that Frege’s argument in the third and fourth paragraphs of the Thought concerns the notion of truth in general. Consequently, I place Frege’s arguments in a broader context than the tradition of philosophical logic based on Tarski and Dummett does. |