Publication details
Legal Interpretation and Language Games
| Authors | |
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| Year of publication | 2023 |
| Type | Appeared in Conference without Proceedings |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Description | In this paper we will focus on a very popular topic among legal theorists, which is the interpretation of normative legal texts. The perspective we will choose for its analysis will be based on the philosophy of language, specifically the philosophy of Wittgenstein, Sellars and Brandom. We will thus view the interpretation of law as a language game. In this way, we will be able to explain how it is that the meaning of particular provisions shifts and changes depending on the practice of those who play the game. In the case of legal interpretation, then, the most important actors are those who authoritatively interpret and apply the law. This fact has been pointed out by H. L. A. Hart. Thus, we will see that meaning is not a static entity that is bound by some referent (indeed, as we know, many legal concepts have no referent in the physical world), but is a dynamic entity that is constituted precisely through this linguistic practice of ours, which is of course bound to the physical world, but not only to it. Especially when discussing law, then its ambition is not usually to describe the physical world, but to "build" the social world in its own specific way, to create order in it and to set explicit rules for its functioning. In this paper we will focus in particular on the discussion of how it is possible to play this game, where implicit rules play a significant role. We will argue that this is due to the fact that man is a normative creature, i.e. that he sees rules all around him. We will also use Wilfrid Sellars' philosophy to defend this position, backed up by the findings of cognitive science. This will be an interdisciplinary exploration of the issue. |
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