Publication details
Hermeneutika a interpretační nespravedlnost
| Title in English | Hermeneutics and interpretive injustice |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Year of publication | 2023 |
| Type | Appeared in Conference without Proceedings |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Description | Hermeneutics is the art of understanding. It deals with language and traditionally seeks to find the correct meaning for the interpreter. It is meant to serve the individual to understand correctly. It is therefore individualistic. But understanding and language are intersubjective and serve a practical social purpose. They are necessary for the cooperation of hypersocial people, which is normally provided through linguistic interaction. The latter takes place between actors whose relationship is saturated with power and influenced by social and moral norms, including prejudice. Understanding can be negatively affected by them and can also be hurtful and unfair. In this regard, I draw on the work of Fricker, Medina, Posey, and others on hermeneutic injustice. Hermeneutic injustice occurs when a significant area of social experience is obscured from collective understanding due to hermeneutic marginalization (Fricker, 2007). It impedes shared understanding and deprives the subject of self-understanding (Fricker, 2007). The subject is silenced, misunderstood, or marginalized (Medina, 2017). Injustice affects the very constitution of the subject who struggles for recognition (Honneth, 1995). In radical cases, it can lead to hermeneutic death (Medina, 2017). Moreover, the marginalized must do more epistemic work than members of the dominant group (Posey, 2021). Hermeneutic injustice is not only an epistemic injustice but also a moral injustice. Since the subject of my interest is hermeneutics proper, I am making a shift in perspective from the above authors. In order not to obscure it, I use the term interpretive injustice. This occurs in the interpretation of speech. Going beyond the existing literature, I argue that interpretive injustice can be conceptualized more generally, not only in relation to marginalized and dominant groups. I argue that the traditional approach to interpretation is inadequate. Hermeneutics should also take into account the social dimension of understanding. To counter injustice, it should be virtuous in both a moral and epistemic sense. |
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