Publication details
Judicialization of Public Administration
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2024 |
| Type | Appeared in Conference without Proceedings |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Description | Ever since the 1980s, political science and constitutional theory continually observe the social phenomenon of judicialization of politics, wherein courts substitute the decision-making of deliberative, political bodies. Judicialization is often described as a multifaceted process, by which decision makers subject to judicial review (most common of those being legislatures) either integrate judicial ways of thinking, or argument solving into their own into an effort to try and curtail the potential of judicial ingression, or pass certain, often unpopular decision onto the courts. The proposed paper is based on the premise that the mechanisms described in the literature coming from different fields can be useful to understand the current-day reality of public administration. The main hypothesis of the proposed paper could be summed up in the statement “it is possible to observe the mechanisms of judicialization in the current-day relationship between public administration and the courts.” There are numerous reasons as to why I believe this hypothesis is sound. One of the above-described mechanisms of judicialization is a kind of calculation of the decision-making body with the potential of judicial oversight and the resulting integration of known judicial opinions into the final decision. When transmuted to the reality of public administration, this reflects the common practice of basing the legal opinions of administrative bodies on the case-law of administrative courts. The reasons for this practice can be assumed to be fairly similar to the reasons described by the relevant literature on the judicialization of politics; chief amongst these being prudency related to the desire not the have a decision quashed by a court after it has been issued. |
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