Publication details
Limits of Believing and Knowing
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2024 |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Description | It has been recently noticed (e.g. by Wisniewski 2011, Fritz 2018) that there exist 'inexpressible' (unthinkable, ..) possible-worlds propositions. Following the book Raclavsky 2020 we prove the existence of three such propositions, related to assertion, belief and knowledge, respectively. This shows that the notions of assertion, belief and knowledge are essentially limited. The assertion case concerns the impossibility to express by X that X is a liar. We defend this Prior's idea against criticism from 1980s (revived recently by Thomason and Tucker), and deploy the proof by Tichy 1988 - applying it even to the belief case. But for the knowledge case we must utilise the Diagonalization theorem, showing that some propositions about X cannot be known by X. We briefly relate the results to some ideas of Gödel's Gibbs lecture as reflected in a part of anti-Lucas-Penrose discussions. |
| Related projects: |