Publication details
Hledání jako pojmový postoj
| Title in English | Seeking as Notional Attitude |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Year of publication | 2004 |
| Type | Article in Proceedings |
| Conference | Používanie, interpretácia a význam jazykových výrazov |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Field | Philosophy and religion |
| Keywords | notional attitudes; propositional attitudes; transparent intensional logic; intensional logic; seeking; looking for |
| Description | Abstract (Seeking as Notional Attitude): As Quine already recognized, there are attitudes that cannot be read in "relational sense" (extensionally), but exclusively in "notional sense" ("John seeks unicorn"). Montague proposed first "intensional" solution for the case of "seeking". We use and extend generalization of his account as being done by logicians using Tichý's Transparent Intensional Logic. (Empirical) notional attitude is characterized as empirical asymmetric relation between an agent (individual) and an intension (its concept cannot be substituted by the concept of another intension). We distinguish four basic kinds of "search-attitudes": "seeking" of the holder of an individual office, i.e., individual-in-intension (for example who is the murderer of somebody if any), "seeking" of the location of the holder of an office (for example the site of Troy if any), "looking for" the holder of an office (like the author of Waverley), "looking for" the location of the holder of an office (searching where is the murderer of somebody); the cases of relations towards intensions other than individual offices or location-offices are analyzed too. |