Informace o publikaci
Power of Disappointment: Overcoming the End of Critical Legal Theory
| Název česky | Síla zklamání: Překonání konce kritické právní vědy |
|---|---|
| Autoři | |
| Rok publikování | 2022 |
| Druh | Další prezentace na konferencích |
| Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
| Citace | |
| Popis | This article adresses supossed end of Critical Legal Studies and its overcoming. Two concepts are crucial here: disappointment and cynicism. Business is booming, declared Professor G. E. White towards CLS movement in 1984. He was referring to the practical victory of CLS, which became mainstream when the radically critical movement transformed into an essentially academic domain. Duncan Kennedy felt the same way, admitting that as a critical movement, CLS was dead as a doornail, however in academia it was "alive and well”. Perhaps a more appropriate statement would be that CLS lays comatose. It is alive, but its wellness is in question. If CLS movement operates on the principle of uncovering the ideological and political foundations of law, its general conclusions in this area are insufficient today. This is because of cynicism that prevails in the era of late capitalism. If we critically uncover the ideological basis of law, the reaction is no longer one of dismay or indignation, but a mere shrug of shoulders. What follows is disappointment at the insurmountable ideological nature of law, the impossibility of proposing alternatives and formulating a positive programme for transformation of legal system. I claim that cynicism and disappointment are fundamental obstacles in the way of recovering a radical critical voice of CLS. But it is possible to conceive of cynicism and disappointment in a completely different way. As a positive driving force that can help us out of this impasse of late capitalism. The aim of this article, along with Hegel, Hölderlin and Lacan, is to show that the situation is not nearly as deadlocked as it may seem. Also, I will tentatively outline ways in which cynicism and disappointment militate our perception of ideology of law and show how to redefine these affects in order to engage in rigorous critique of law. |