Publication details

Action Investment Energy Games

Authors

LARSEN Kim G. LAURSEN Simon SRBA Jiří

Year of publication 2013
Type Article in Proceedings
Conference Proceedings of Mathematical and Engineering Methods in Computer Science (MEMICS'12)
MU Faculty or unit

Faculty of Informatics

Citation
Doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36046-6_15
Field Informatics
Keywords energy games; cost; infinite runs; complexity
Description We introduce the formalism of action investment energy games where we study the trade-off between investments limited by given budgets and resource constrained (energy) behavior of the underlying system. More specifically, we consider energy games extended with costs of enabling actions and fixed budgets for each player. We ask the question whether for any Player 2 investment there exists a Player 1 investment such that Player 1 wins the resulting energy game. We study the action investment energy game for energy intervals with both upper and lower bounds, and with a lower bound only, and give a complexity results overview for the problem of deciding the winner in the game.
Related projects:

You are running an old browser version. We recommend updating your browser to its latest version.

More info