Publication details
Language in a Synchronic / Diachronic Sense and Some Philosophical Puzzles
| Authors | |
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| Year of publication | 2013 |
| Type | Conference abstract |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Description | The distinction "language in synchronic / language in diachronic sense", so well-known among linguists, is largely unknown or unused in the philosophy of language. This is unfortunate, since there are various philosophical puzzles which can be easily solved by applying this distinction, but which have no uncontroversial solution when avoiding it. In my view, one implicitly presupposes a notion of language in all of the puzzles; consequently, an adequate solution should make the notion of language explicit, carefully distinguishing between its possible construals; overlooking the notion of language leads to the hidden equivocation of properties peculiar to each construal and gives then rise to the false impression of paradoxicality. In the present talk, I suggest one particular (formal) model of language in both synchronic and diachronic sense, a model which seems to be acceptable across the logical/philosophical community. Then, a solution to puzzles such as synthetic a priori, naming future or past individuals, standard meter, simple identities in belief sentences, etc., - most of them being discussed in kripkean and postkripkean literature -, is at hand. |
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