Publication details
Daňová morálka a daňové úniky v ekonomických experimentech
| Title in English | Tax Compliance in Econonomic Experiments |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Year of publication | 2015 |
| Type | Article in Periodical |
| Magazine / Source | Sociální studia |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Field | Economy |
| Keywords | laboratory experiment; tax compliance; voluntary contribution mechanism; penalty; audit |
| Description | Tax compliance and tax evasion belong to the issues where laboratory experiments may provide important insights into human economic decision making. The theoretical model based on expected utility theory and presumption of a rational individual (homo economicus), is not able to cover the complexity of individual compliance decision. Even though this phenomenon may be studied in the field, its real observability is limited. This is where results of laboratory testing may help “fill the gap”. The analysis proposed by our paper focuses on several goals. Taking into consideration a relatively low awareness of the Czech academic community, we (i) discuss the relevance of laboratory experiment method for studying taxpayers’ behavior, basing on a (ii) summary of state of knowledge in the domain in question. The experimental is method is elaborated more in detail by (iii) presenting the results of our own experimental research. In our experiment we focused on testing the impact of two basic fiscal variables on individual tax compliance; the goal was to evaluate the effect of variable probability of an audit and rate of penalty imposed in the case of tax evasion. Our research question was whether, and to what extent, changing levels of tested variables would influence taxpayers’ behaviour, or, her willingness to comply. The results show that reaction of the Czech subjects on a parametric change of these two variables is quite similar to what we observe in foreign experiments. Increasing level of probability of an audit has strong (positive) impact on tax compliance. On the other hand, the level of penalty imposed to revealed defaulter is not of major influence. |
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