Publication details
Security improvements of several basic quantum private query protocols with O(log N) communication complexity
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2020 |
| Type | Article in Periodical |
| Magazine / Source | Theoretical Computer Science |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Web | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2019.12.008 |
| Doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2019.12.008 |
| Keywords | Private database query protocol; O (log N) communication complexity; Cheat-sensitivity; Rhetoric query; Dishonest database; Privacy |
| Description | New quantum private database (with N elements) query protocols are presented and analyzed. Protocols preserve O (log N) communication complexity of known protocols for the same task, but achieve several significant improvements in security, especially concerning user privacy. For example, the randomized form of our protocol has a cheat-sensitive property - it allows the user to detect a dishonest database with a nonzero probability, while the phase-encoded private query protocols [6,7] for the same task do not have such a property. Moreover, when the database performs the computational basis measurement, a particular projective measurement which can cause a significant loss of user privacy in the previous private query protocols with O (log N) communication complexity, at most half of the user privacy could leak to such a database in our protocol, while in the QPQ protocol [5], the entire user privacy could leak out. In addition, it is proved here that for large N, the user could detect a cheating via the computational basis measurement, with a probability close to 1/2 using O(root N) special queries. Finally, it is shown here, for both forms of our protocol, basic and randomized, how a dishonest database has to act in case it could not learn user's queries. |