Publication details
Metaethics of Human Rights: An Expressivist Approach
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2020 |
| Type | Article in Periodical |
| Magazine / Source | Rechtstheorie |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Web | Web nakladatele |
| Keywords | human rights; metaphysics; metaethics; expressivism |
| Description | Moral objectivity can be understood in different ways. I will compare two approaches here. The metaphysical realism presupposes a strong conception of moral objectivity. According to this view, human rights are not only morally justified claims of people, but they are somehow built into the world itself. On the other hand, the expressivism prefers a weaker conception of moral objectivity which can be explained by the very nature of moral reasoning. In any process of moral justification, speakers express their moral attitudes that presuppose the claim to objectivity. The disadvantage of metaphysical realism is the epistemic uncertainty about the existence and content of moral reality. This permanent doubt has a perilous potential to slip into deep moral scepticism. I will conclude that human rights are objective at least in the weaker sense. The objectivity of human rights is nothing supernatural, it is an entirely human matter. This weak conception of objectivity is not encoded in non-natural reality, but rather in the way we think and talk about human rights. |
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