Publication details
Dědičné zlo právních skutečností
| Title in English | The Hereditary Evil of Legal Facts |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Year of publication | 2024 |
| Type | Article in Periodical |
| Magazine / Source | Pravnik |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Web | Open access článku |
| Keywords | legal facts; legal consequences; legal causes; theory of legal facts; statutory substance of the legal norm; subsumption; facticity and law |
| Description | Since the 1950s, Czech civil law has been dominated by the Marxist interpretation of the theory of legal facts, which, following the historical-legal school, considers legal facts to be the legal causes of private legal consequences, i.e. the creation, modification or cessation of subjective rights and legal obligations. From the perspective of German and Austrian civil law, Savigny’s theory is a long-outdated concept, creating its own legal world, which is independent of the real world and which ultimately prevents the comprehension of private law regulation. In private law, there are principally two legal reasons: the statute and legal act. The statute, as a legal norm, prescribes legal consequences expressed in itself if the facts specified by the norm occur. Individual facts are thus in principle only factual conditions for legal consequences expressed in the statute, not “legal” causes (reasons) for the creation, modification or cessation of subjective rights and legal obligations. An exception is a legal act which is the legal cause of legal consequences if it creates an autonomous law. However, the legal consequences of a legal act must be guaranteed by statute. Therefore, the creation of private legal consequences always happens on the basis of the statute and is merely a process of objective subsumption of a certain factual basis under the statutory substance of the relevant legal norm. Therefore, the author suggests that Czech legal doctrine should reject the constructivist theory of legal facts and begin to explain the creation of legal consequences on the basis of a mere subsumption of the concrete under the abstract. In private law, legal consequences do not arise from facts, but from the statute (and from legal acts, or constitutive judgments, based on the statute). |
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