council on the use of these mechanisms. However, these issues cannot be studied in the abstract. For this reason, the project examines the use
of mechanisms of judicial accountability in the Czech Republic and Slovakia as well as the impact of introducing the Judicial Council of Slovak
Republic on the use of these mechanisms.

The empirical part of the project is built around four central hypotheses. First, in both countries the executive branch and/or the court presidents
are dominant “accounting agents” (principals) of judges, whereas the public is a marginal “accounting agent” (principal) of judges. Second, in both
countries mechanisms of judicial accountability that allow the dominant “accounting agents” to hold judges to account are preferred to other
available mechanisms of judicial accountability. Third, in both countries de facto judicial accountability significantly differs from de iure judicial
accountability. Fourth, introduction of a judicial council in Slovakia enhanced overall judicial accountability, enhanced accountability of judges to
their respective court presidents, and increased the gap between de facto judicial accountability and de iure judicial accountability.

The project is divided into three parts. Part I defines the notion of judicial accountability, identifies mechanisms of judicial accountability and
provides a typology of models of the court administration in Europe. Parts II focuses exclusively on the Czech Republic and Slovakia and tests the
four hypotheses mentioned above. It first identifies the mechanisms of judicial accountability employed by each country between 1993 and 2010
and subsequently measures them against to the criteria developed earlier in the chapter. Part III looks beyond the borders of the Czech Republic
and Slovakia and addresses the broader normative implications.

Publications